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The Master of the Senate and the 
Presidential Hidden Hand: Eisenhower, 
Johnson, and Power Dynamics in the 1950s 
by Samuel J. Cooper-Wall 
 
 In March of 2010, renowned architect Frank 
Gehry unveiled his design for a memorial to Dwight 
D. Eisenhower in Washington, D.C. Centered 
around an elaborate layout of stone blocks running 
along a city-block of Maryland Avenue is the 
featured aspect of Gehry‘s design: a narrative 
tapestry of scenes from Eisenhower‘s life. Over 
seven stories tall, the tapestry will impede the view 
of the building located directly behind it. That 
building is the Department of Education, named for 
Lyndon Johnson.
1
 Decades after two of the greatest 
political titans of the twentieth century had passed 
                                                 
1
 Philip Kennicott, ―A New Wrinkle: Gehry‘s 
Eisenhower Memorial is Bold but not Curvy,‖ The 
Washington Post, March 26, 2010, C1. 
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away, their legacies were still in competition. In 
many ways, then, it is fitting that, as a great 
monument will be laid for Dwight Eisenhower in 
the nation‘s capitol, scholars have begun 
reassessing him as a leader and a president. One 
aspect of his presidency that has needed to be 
reevaluated is his fascinating relationship with 
Johnson. They came from different political parties 
and had different visions for America, yet there was 
a time when circumstances bound them in a 
meaningful, though unstable, political dynamic. For 
six years of his presidency, the moderate 
Republican Eisenhower had to work constructively 
with a Congress dominated by Democrats in order 
to get his agenda passed. As Majority Leader of the 
United States Senate during this period, Johnson 
saw an opportunity to raise the standing of the 
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Democratic Party and his own ambitions for the 
presidency by aligning himself with, and 
occasionally undermining, President Eisenhower. 
Although neither man fully achieved his goals in 
this partnership, it nevertheless proved fruitful for 
both. Their interaction sheds light on them as 
individuals and leaders. Further, a closer inspection 
of many legislative triumphs previously credited to 
Johnson actually contained the artful influence of 
President Eisenhower, proving his political prowess 
applied to Johnson and the legislative process. 
Paths to Power and Finding Common Ground 
 In many ways, the dynamic between these 
two men took shape at their very first meeting. Two 
weeks after Nazi Germany surrendered to the allies, 
Texas Congressman Lyndon B. Johnson received 
permission to take one of his small subcommittees 
 159 
to Europe. Although his travel was under the guise 
of making an evaluation about how the U.S. Navy 
could help support a strong postwar defense effort, 
Johnson was most anxious to view conditions on the 
ground in Europe in order to enhance his credentials 
for taking part in postwar planning. Although 
Commanding General Dwight D. Eisenhower‘s 
staff complained about the timing of Johnson‘s 
visit, Eisenhower himself nevertheless charmed 
Johnson and his colleagues by briefing them about 
conditions in Europe. He also instructed his aides to 
allow Johnson‘s delegation to go wherever they 
desired and to ensure that they had ―a very pleasant 
and wonderful visit.‖2 Johnson benefitted politically 
from the visit, while Eisenhower dutifully and 
                                                 
2
 Robert Dallek, Lone Star Rising: Lyndon Johnson 
and His Times, 1908-1960 (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), 269-270. 
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quietly satisfied any obligation he had to those 
public servants. Although neither man could have 
realized it at the time, this encounter foreshadowed 
a future relationship. 
Seven years later Johnson and Eisenhower were 
reunited in the political realm. The election of 1952 
saw Eisenhower win the presidency with the largest 
margin of victory since the landslides of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. His popularity, dating to World War II, 
made him a political star. The Republicans also 
regained a two-seat majority in the Senate. One of 
the Democratic casualties that year was Majority 
Leader Ernest McFarland of Arizona. McFarland‘s 
defeat meant his assistant leader, Lyndon Johnson, 
who had only been in the Senate for four years, was 
now the highest ranking man in the Democratic 
caucus. Despite his inexperience, Johnson began 
 161 
campaigning among his colleagues to be the new 
Minority Leader for the 1953 session of Congress. 
With the support of influential Georgia Senator 
Richard Russell, Johnson got the job; though, at that 
time, there was little competition for the leadership 
of Senate Democrats.
3
 The last two occupants of the 
position had been defeated for reelection while 
trying to defend the increasingly unpopular policies 
of President Harry S. Truman. However, Johnson 
sensed a new opportunity with a popular 
Republican now in the White House: if Democrats 
could align themselves with Eisenhower wherever 
possible, they stood to benefit from his massive 
appeal - an approach seemingly verified by the 
Democratic triumphs in the 1954 midterm elections, 
                                                 
3
 On January 2, 1953, Democrats elected the forty-
four year old Johnson to be the youngest party leader in the 
history of the Senate. Ibid., 422-425. 
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which made Johnson Senate Majority Leader.
4
 As a 
result of this mindset, Johnson took pride in 
                                                 
4
 Robert A. Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson: 
Master of the Senate (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), 
521. Interestingly, Eisenhower during this time was extending 
his political influence across the country, even to Lyndon 
Johnson‘s own reelection campaign. The Texas Republican 
Party, led by Jack Porter, Johnson‘s opponent in 1948, was 
seeking a candidate capable of using Eisenhower‘s coattails to 
overpower the Democratic leader, a strategy Eisenhower 
applauded and encouraged. See Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 439. 
The President, though, did not take an active role in the 
campaign, but behind-the-scenes he ordered executive 
agencies to ―step up expenditures to stimulate industrial 
activity‖ in hopes that might make a difference by the time of 
the election. By October, though, polls showed the 
Republicans were vulnerable, so Eisenhower undertook a ten-
thousand mile campaign tour. Along the way, Eisenhower 
declared that if the Democrats retook control of Congress, 
they would start ―a Cold War of partisan politics.‖ See Dallek, 
Lone Star Rising, 460. Johnson and House Democratic Leader 
Sam Rayburn took offense, sending the President a telegram 
calling his remarks an ―unjust attack on the many Democrats 
who have done so much to cooperate with him and the 
Administration and to defend his program from attacks by 
members and leaders of his own party.‖ They also declared 
that, as far as they were concerned, no partisan war would 
occur if the Democrats retook control of Congress and that 
they would continue to support an ―enlightened foreign policy 
against the Republican reactionaries . . .‖ See Lyndon B. 
Johnson and Samuel Rayburn to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 9 
October 1954, White House Central File, Alphabetical Series, 
Box 1599, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
Regardless of whatever their motives were, Johnson and 
Rayburn did have a point. And this telegram was not the only 
example of Johnson trying to prove his intentions and abilities 
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supporting aspects of Eisenhower‘s agenda, 
especially foreign policy.
5
 One example was 
                                                                                     
to the President; during a 1957 breakfast meeting with 
Eisenhower, Johnson presented him with papers which 
demonstrated that the current 85th Congressional session had 
spent far more time in session and passed more legislation 
compared to the Republican-controlled 83rd Congress. 
Eisenhower‘s secretary, Ann Whitman, noted in a 
memorandum on the matter that ―The Senator is sensitive, 
apparently, in this respect.‖ See Ann C. Whitman, 
Memorandum of Appointment, 26 August 1957, Ann 
Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, Dwight D. 
Eisenhower Presidential Library. 
5
 In 1965, Johnson recounted his intentions towards 
Eisenhower to the newly elected House of Representatives 
Republican leader, Gerald Ford. Johnson said he told 
Eisenhower, ―Mr. President, when I agree with you, I‘ll come 
tell you. I‘ll disagree with you with dignity and decency, and I 
won‘t talk about your dog or your boy. But I‘ll try to offer an 
alternative . . .‖ Later in his conversation with Ford, Johnson 
claimed to have never had a quarrelsome word with 
Eisenhower for six years. While Johnson romanticized his 
relationship with Eisenhower, this attitude reflected Johnson‘s 
desire for a partnership. See Michael Beschloss, Reaching for 
Glory: Lyndon Johnson’s Secret White House Tapes (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 165. In his conversations 
with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, there is strong 
evidence of Johnson‘s desire to cooperate. The two met on 
occasion and extended great courtesy to each other as they 
exchanged ideas, prompting Dulles to write the President after 
one such chat, ―I had a very gratifying talk with Lyndon 
Johnson. He came to see me just prior to leaving for Europe 
this afternoon. It was not only marked by great personal 
warmth but a sincere desire to help find a way to get bipartisan 
backing for our foreign policies.‖ Dulles went on to reiterate 
Johnson‘s assurance that if the administration would cooperate 
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Johnson‘s quick approval of a measure granting 
Eisenhower full authority to use the U.S. Armed 
Forces in 1955 to defend Taiwanese islands around 
Formosa from Chinese air attacks.
6
 Later, following 
the 1956 election, foreign policy returned as a 
forefront issue during the Suez Crisis, as Britain and 
France launched an assault on the Egyptian military 
on the Sinai Peninsula and the Suez Canal. On 
November 9, 1956, Eisenhower arranged to have 
Congressional leaders briefed about conditions on 
the Sinai, in hopes this would help get approval for 
proposals which increased the chief executive‘s 
authority to handle the American response to the 
                                                                                     
and counsel with himself and Democratic Senate Whip Mike 
Mansfield, he was confident Eisenhower‘s policies would be 
supported by most of the Democratic caucus. See John Foster 
Dulles to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 13 November 1956, Ann 
Whitman File, Dulles-Herter Series, Box 8, DDEL. 
6
 This 1955 measure would later serve as Johnson‘s 
inspiration for the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in 1964. See 
Tom Wicker, Dwight D. Eisenhower (New York: Henry Holt 
and Company, 2002), 79. 
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crisis. Eisenhower‘s plan worked perfectly, as 
Johnson found the briefing ―very fruitful and 
helpful‖ and promised he would not play politics 
with foreign policy. By meeting face-to-face with 
Democrats, Eisenhower assured Johnson and other 
Senators that he was firmly in control of the 
situation.
7
 Johnson also supported Eisenhower‘s 
―open skies‖ proposal, calling the plan for the 
superpowers to be able to fly over each other‘s 
nations to observe nuclear armament facilities an 
―imaginative stroke.‖ Johnson further recommended 
an ―open curtain‖ policy, which encouraged the free 
movement of people and ideas between the 
communist and democratic areas of the world 
                                                 
7
 Cole C. Kingseed, Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis 
of 1956 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
1995), 137. 
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without being subjected to suspicion.
8
 Soon after, as 
Johnson lay in a hospital recovering from his first 
heart attack, Eisenhower thanked him for this 
support, writing, ―Thank you ever so much. I am 
greatly pleased by what you had to say. I do hope 
you are rapidly improving.‖9 This gracious and 
respectful tone found in their early correspondence 
was symbolic of their meaningful efforts to 
cooperate on critical foreign policy issues in the 
first years of the Eisenhower Administration. 
Johnson‘s alignment with the President was 
necessitated by the latter‘s obvious popularity, still 
strong even a decade after World War II ended. As 
                                                 
8
 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: 
Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969 (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 470. 
9
 Galambos and Van Ee, Dwight D. Eisenhower to 
Lyndon B. Johnson, The Presidential Papers of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, 
http://www.eisenhowermemorial.org/presidential-papers/first-
term/documents/1531.cfm. 
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long as Eisenhower was doing well in the polls, 
Johnson was likely to support him. As Eisenhower‘s 
reelection approached in 1956, Johnson‘s support 
for the President was remarkably nonpartisan in 
nature. In fact, Johnson was careful to avoid 
criticizing the President, because, as Doris Kearns 
wrote, ―Johnson felt that to attack Eisenhower 
would be ‗like telling children that their father was 
a bad man . . . ‘‖10 Johnson took specific action to 
appease the President, including allocating an 
additional five million dollars for the Overseas 
Information Program after Eisenhower placed a call 
to him on the matter in May of 1956.
11
 With such 
action, Johnson‘s standing with Eisenhower grew. 
                                                 
10
 Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American 
Dream (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), 155. 
11
 According to South Dakota Senator Karl Mundt, 
Johnson had intended to support a cut of the OIP budget prior 
to Eisenhower‘s request to the contrary. Karl Mundt to Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, White House Central Files, Alphabetical File, 
Box 1599, DDEL. 
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As the campaign of 1956 neared, Eisenhower even 
believed the Democrats might nominate Johnson to 
run against him. In his memoirs, Eisenhower 
observed that Johnson would have ―. . . had better 
vote-getting power‖ than the actual nominee, Adlai 
Stevenson.
12
 For his part, Johnson viewed the 
President‘s reelection as inevitable. Sid Richardson 
reported to Eisenhower on November 8th that 
Johnson had told him that ―The President is going 
to carry Texas . . . and I am going to continue to 
work with him.‖13 Eisenhower not only carried 
Texas, but won in a landslide greater than that of his 
first campaign. However, the close cooperation 
between the two politicians had already reached its 
                                                 
12
 Eisenhower, Dwight D. Waging Peace: The White 
House Years 1956-1961 (New York: Doubleday & Company, 
Inc., 1965), 11. 
13
 Galambos and Van Ee, Sid Richardson to Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, The Presidential Papers of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower: The Middle Way, Vol. 17 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2001), 2376. 
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apex. Johnson‘s biographer Robert Dallek explained 
that in Eisenhower‘s second term, ―Johnson was 
reluctant to abandon the bipartisanship that he 
believed had served the country and congressional 
Democrats during Ike‘s first term. But pressure 
from liberals, a defense of congressional 
prerogatives, and genuine differences over Middle 
East policy pushed him into a conflict with Ike,‖ 
and the result was Johnson‘s allegiance to 
Eisenhower waning over the rest of the decade.
14
 
For the Democratic leader, this strategy appeared 
quite wise, but what he had failed to anticipate, and 
what some scholars have failed to grasp, was how 
Eisenhower in turn used Johnson to his own 
political advantage. 
Eisenhower‘s Approach to Johnson and Congress 
                                                 
14
 Dallek, Lone Star Rising, 511. 
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 In order to more fully understand this 
dynamic, historiographical conclusions must be 
analyzed and reevaluated. Chief among them is the 
perception of President Eisenhower as ―. . . an aging 
hero who reigned more than he ruled and lacked the 
energy, motivation, and political know-how to have 
a significant impact on events.‖15 Originally the 
view of cynical liberals in the 1950s, it had made its 
way into early historical analysis of Eisenhower and 
public perception about the President. Modern 
scholars, such as Fred Greenstein, have discovered 
that Eisenhower was a far more devious and clever 
strategist than his critics had assumed. In fact, he 
employed a shrewd ―hidden-hand‖ methodology 
which concealed a great deal of his leadership 
                                                 
15
 Fred Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency: 
Eisenhower as Leader (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982), 
5. 
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initiatives while enabling him room to maneuver 
within the political system.
16
 Akin to many aspects 
of his presidency, Eisenhower‘s interactions with 
Congress typically invoked a philosophy derived 
from this hidden-hand style of leadership. It was a 
multi-faceted approach that, interestingly enough, 
had a similar concept as that of an extensive study 
written by Democratic attorney James Rowe for 
                                                 
16
 Ibid., 5-6. Yet, while the ―hidden-hand‖ strategy 
proved effective for Eisenhower, it also allowed for others to 
portray him as a weak leader. Lyndon Johnson, on the 
contrary, exercised his power overtly and commandingly. 
Known as the ―master of the Senate,‖ Johnson‘s leadership 
strategies have become part of Senate lore. He knew how to 
count and gather votes, and was capable of intimidating, 
threatening, bribing, cajoling, amusing, or flattering in order to 
wrangle support. His biographer Robert Caro wrote, ―He used 
the powers he found and the powers he created with a raw, 
elemental brutality.‖ Caro, The Years of Lyndon Johnson, xxi. 
Eisenhower, though, saw through the Senate Democratic 
leader. Eisenhower‘s friend William E. Robinson remembered 
the President, while watching the 1960 Democratic 
Convention, saying of Johnson, ―He is a small man. He hasn‘t 
got the depth of mind nor the breadth of vision to carry great 
responsibility. Any floor leader of a Senate majority party 
looks good, no matter how incompetent he may be. Johnson is 
superficial and opportunistic.‖ Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand 
Presidency, 28. 
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Harry Truman after the Republican Party won both 
houses of Congress in the 1946 midterm elections. 
Rowe‘s report ended up in Eisenhower‘s White 
House files after Truman left office, though there is 
no evidence that Eisenhower himself ever read it. 
That said, many of Rowe‘s recommendations were 
also part of Eisenhower‘s strategy and it serves as a 
valuable lens for further examining the tactics of 
President Eisenhower.  
 Rowe laid out historical precedents for his 
conclusions concerning the success of Presidential 
dealings with Congress. He noted that Presidents 
such as Grover Cleveland and William Howard Taft 
tended not to vocally berate Congressional 
opposition, since this kind of behavior often harmed 
the President and his reputation more than his 
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targets.
17
 Eisenhower avoided such confrontations 
by limiting his criticism of Congress in public. 
Rarely did an intense disagreement between 
Eisenhower and Johnson become news or public 
knowledge. Eisenhower‘s kindness and diplomacy 
shown in many interactions with Johnson certainly 
signaled a legitimate feeling that the President 
preferred Johnson as a friend, not an enemy.
18
 This 
                                                 
17
 James Rowe, ―Cooperation or Conflict: The 
President‘s relationships with an opposition Congress‖, White 
House Central Files, Permanent File, Box 2, DDEL, 3. 
18
 The formal correspondence between the two was 
almost always kind, if not warm, in nature. This is especially 
true for the summer of 1955, when both Johnson and then 
Eisenhower were stricken with heart attacks. After hearing of 
Eisenhower‘s health troubles, Johnson wrote to the President 
expressing a strong desire to continue to cooperate with him. 
The President‘s Chief of Staff, Sherman Adams, replied to 
Johnson, writing that the letter was ―. . . very pleasing to 
[Eisenhower]. He asks me to say that he echoes your desire 
that there be fullest cooperation between the leaders of the 
Congress and the administration on every matter important to 
the welfare and safety of our country.‖ See Sherman Adams to 
Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 October 1955, White House Central 
Files, the President‘s Personal File, Box 973, DDEL. Wilton 
Persons, Eisenhower‘s Congressional liaison aide, latter 
recalled that their respective heart problems brought 
Eisenhower and Johnson closer together, ―They belonged to 
 174 
attitude was very much unlike Herbert Hoover, for 
example, who became so ―publicly argumentative‖ 
with Congress that it approved little of his agenda. 
To ease or prevent tension, Rowe viewed personal 
meetings with opposition leaders as significant 
gestures toward cooperation. Indeed, scheduling 
records indicate that Eisenhower occasionally 
breakfasted with the Senate Democratic leader and 
regularly invited Johnson and House Speaker Sam 
Rayburn to private evening meetings at the White 
House. Rowe also recommended that the President 
should ―act and speak at all times in terms of public 
welfare and not as partisan.‖19 The Congress would 
be more likely to support the President whenever he 
has popular support on his side. According to Rowe, 
                                                                                     
the same cub, so to speak.‖ See Wilton B. Persons Oral 
History, OH #334, DDEL. 
19
 Rowe, ―Cooperation or Conflict,‖ 25. 
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―The history of every administration shows that in 
the final analysis a President has but one weapon: 
public opinion.‖20 Eisenhower was accustomed to 
this practice as well, partially because he knew his 
intentions far better than those of many 
Congressmen. As Eisenhower once confided to 
friend Edward ―Swede‖ Hazlett, ―In the general 
case each [member of Congress] thinks of himself 
as intensely patriotic; but it does not take the 
average member long to conclude that his first duty 
to his country is to get himself re-elected.‖21 
Eisenhower accused Johnson and others of such 
pettiness, but was fortunate that he himself had a 
degree of popularity which left little doubt to his 
reelection. Although he was never able to bring 
                                                 
20
 Ibid., 5. 
21
 Dwight D. Eisenhower to Edward E. Hazlett, 22 
July 1957, Ann Whitman File, DDE Diary Series, Box 5, 
DDEL. 
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Republican majorities back into either house 
following their loss of power in the 1954 midterms, 
Eisenhower proved capable of working with 
Johnson and the Democratic Congress. 
 Another significant method Eisenhower 
employed specifically on Johnson was the use of 
intermediaries. Some were congressional allies, 
who kept tabs on the Senate Democratic leader. 
This was one assignment in which Republican 
leader William Knowland, who did not often hold 
the confidence of the President, was particularly 
useful. With his desk on the Senate floor right 
across the center aisle from Johnson, Knowland was 
ideally situated to be able to gather some 
information to pass along to Eisenhower, including 
a possible rift between Johnson and his mentor, 
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Sam Rayburn, in 1957.
22
 Two specific men, though, 
managed the job best. In the early days of the 
presidency, the primary go-between was Sid 
Richardson. The Texas millionaire made his fortune 
in oil, and he and Eisenhower had been friends for 
over twenty years. He also was a financial 
contributor to both the President and Johnson, 
making him the ideal person to discreetly handle 
Johnson on Eisenhower‘s behalf. Eisenhower, with 
counsel from Treasury Secretary George 
Humphrey, used Richardson to encourage Johnson 
to support the administration‘s policy wherever 
possible. In one instance Eisenhower had a hand in 
plans to suggest Richardson threaten support for a 
primary election challenge to Johnson from Texas 
Governor Allen Shivers in 1954 unless the 
                                                 
22
 Ann C. Whitman Diary, 29 August 1957, Ann 
Whitman File, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 9, DDEL. 
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Democratic leader got on board with certain 
Eisenhower policies.
23
  
 After Richardson‘s death in 1959, 
Eisenhower‘s second Treasury Secretary, Robert 
Anderson, another Texan, stepped in to the role. 
When reflecting on this experience in a letter to 
Johnson several months after Eisenhower‘s death, 
Anderson recalled that this liaison was established 
―. . . on the basis of preserving completely the 
[Democratic] party integrity and the absolute right 
of dissent, but so that we did not confront either the 
Administration or the Congressional leadership with 
surprise suggestions which might not be in our 
national interest either politically or economically.‖ 
Anderson also remembered that the information 
                                                 
23
 Shivers and Johnson had one of the greatest 
rivalries in Texas politics, mainly due to Shiver‘s bucking of 
the Democrats in 1952 to support Eisenhower. Greenstein, The 
Hidden-Hand Presidency, 59-60. 
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discussed by the President or Johnson with him 
would be kept confidential from the cabinet, though 
he did reserve the right to report anything Johnson 
told him to Eisenhower. Lastly, Anderson 
nostalgically noted the ―free exchange‖ of ideas 
between them, and how their relationship was much 
stronger than future presidents with Congressional 
leaders, including John Kennedy‘s relationship with 
Everett Dirksen, Johnson‘s with Dirksen (in the 
1960s), or Nixon‘s with Congressional Democrats 
in the early 1970s. Although Anderson may have 
idealized the Eisenhower-Johnson relationship as he 
wrote to his fellow Texan so many years after the 
fact, he was certainly in a position to see the 
cordiality and respect the two showed for each 
other.
24
  
                                                 
24
 Robert B. Anderson to Lyndon B. Johnson, 19 
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 The use of intermediaries was a creative 
tactic on Eisenhower‘s part, but probably even more 
effective were his more personal meetings with 
Johnson, an approach highlighted in the Rowe 
Report. Even when the Democrats were the 
minority party in Congress, Eisenhower invited 
Johnson and Rayburn to the White House to talk 
policy and politics over drinks and light 
refreshments. The three were comfortable talking 
with each other in this setting and were able to bond 
over the fact that they were all born Texans (though 
Eisenhower was raised in Kansas).
25
 Most 
importantly, these meetings surely allowed 
                                                                                     
March 1970, Anderson Papers, Box 344, DDEL. Anderson 
also would periodically write summaries for Eisenhower about 
Johnson‘s political stances on certain issues for the President‘s 
use, even against other Democrats such as Richard Russell. 
Robert B. Anderson to Dwight D. Eisenhower, 30 December 
1958, Ann Whitman File, Administration Series, Box 2, 
DDEL. 
25
 Irwin Unger and Debi Unger, LBJ: A Life (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1999),168. 
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Eisenhower to get a better sense of Johnson‘s 
persona and character, and thus allowing him to 
more easily take the pulse of his so-called ―loyal 
opposition‖ in Congress.26  
 Overall, these tactics proved essential for 
Eisenhower over the six year period in which the 
President and the powerful Majority Leader worked 
to guide the legislative process. Johnson was 
obsessed with public approval and press attention. 
Eisenhower understood Johnson‘s motives in this 
regard, and privately referred to the Democratic 
                                                 
26
 Johnson, on the other hand, fell victim to 
somewhat underestimating Eisenhower. According to assistant 
George Reedy, Johnson went so far as to think White House 
Press Secretary James Hagerty was ― . . . responsible for the 
esteem in which the nation held Eisenhower.‖ See George 
Reedy, Lyndon B. Johnson: A Memoir (New York: Andrews 
and McMeel, Inc., 1982), 67. Perhaps Johnson even had a 
sense of his own self-superiority existed, if so it was enhanced 
by his devoted staff. Foremost among them was Reedy, who 
said in his memoir on Johnson that the Senate Majority Leader 
was the most influential leader of the early 1950s, more so 
than even Eisenhower. Ibid., xiii. 
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leader as a ―phony.‖27 Eisenhower also displayed no 
inclination to trust Johnson, as the Majority Leader 
clearly wanted Eisenhower‘s job and would employ 
devious political strategies to get it. Yet, no matter 
the degree to which Eisenhower detested Johnson‘s 
―superficial and opportunistic‖ qualities, the 
President was aware of his own popularity and how 
this could be used as leverage over the Senate 
leader.
28
 It was also clear to Eisenhower that he 
would need the help of Democrats to pass his 
agenda, which was not conservative enough to suit 
the Taft wing of the Republican Party. To achieve 
Democratic support, Eisenhower treated Johnson 
with great respect, even placing him on five-person 
                                                 
27
 Wicker, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 134. 
28
 Eisenhower quoted by Arthur Krock. W.J. 
Rorabaugh, The Real Making of the President: Kennedy, 
Nixon, and the 1960 Election (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2009), 30. 
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committee which would be tasked with determining 
his (Eisenhower‘s) own fitness to continue in office 
should his health severely deteriorate or if an 
ailment, such as a stroke, limited his mental 
capacities.
29
  
 Eisenhower‘s tactics, right down to his 
efforts to accommodate Johnson‘s ego, as well as 
his incredible patience which the Democratic 
leader, showed how effective the President was at 
managing and even manipulating what could have 
been a bitter adversary into a respectful opponent 
and a partial ally. And while his tactics were 
inventive if not brilliant, comparatively few 
scholars have assessed Eisenhower‘s subtle role in 
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the crucial legislative issues of the day. As a result, 
the stereotype of Eisenhower as a passive president 
persists. To better understand Eisenhower and 
Johnson‘s relationship and comparative powers, a 
more complete picture is required. Several 
significant case studies, ranging throughout the 
Presidency, serve to enhance Eisenhower‘s true role 
in this dynamic. Taken together, they represent each 
man‘s strengths and power.  
Early Cooperation and the Emergence of 
Eisenhower‘s Leadership Abilities 
 ―We are in the minority,‖ Johnson told the 
Senate Democratic Conference after assuming the 
party leadership in early 1953, adding ―I have never 
agreed with the statement that it is ‗the business of 
the opposition to oppose.‘ I do not believe the 
American people have sent us here merely to 
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obstruct.‖30 Knowing full well that it was not in his 
own best interest to make an enemy in Eisenhower, 
Johnson supported the President where practicable. 
Johnson moved quickly to extend the olive branch 
to Eisenhower by accepting the nominees for the 
Presidential cabinet, declaring ―I am anxious to 
cooperate with the President in carrying out his 
mandate. Unless there is a violation of some 
important principle, I believe the President should 
have around him the men he has selected.‖31 One of 
the most contentious nominees needed Johnson‘s 
help the most. Eisenhower had selected Charles 
―Chip‖ Bohlen to be Ambassador to the Soviet 
Union in April 1953. Bohlen was a career diplomat 
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with experience in dealing with the Soviets, but 
anticommunist maverick Senator Joseph R. 
McCarthy vehemently opposed Bohlen‘s 
confirmation because the latter had taken part in the 
Yalta Conference, which had yielded sections of 
Germany and the city of Berlin to Soviet influence. 
In addition, McCarthy implied that Bohlen was as a 
homosexual and demanded access to Bohlen‘s FBI 
file.
32
 Eisenhower denied McCarthy access to the 
file but allowed it to be reviewed by Senate 
Majority Leader Robert Taft, who found in it 
nothing worthy of disqualifying Bohlen. On the 
Senate floor Johnson defended Bohlen, and accused 
McCarthy and his supporters of questioning the 
integrity of President Eisenhower. With support 
from Johnson and the Democrats, Bohlen was 
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confirmed in a 74 to 13 vote. As a result, Johnson 
knew he and the Democrats benefitted from this 
issue while the Republicans seemed divided. Not 
for the last time, Johnson got good press and 
Eisenhower got what he wanted out of the Senate.
33
  
A Common Enemy: Right-Wing Senators 
 At the beginning of the 1953 session of 
Congress, conservative Ohio Senator John Bricker 
offered an amendment limiting the President‘s 
power to conduct foreign affairs by granting 
authority to Congress to approve international 
compacts and treaties and by restricting the 
President from making any treaty which violated 
the Constitution. Eisenhower did not feel that such 
an amendment was truly necessary, but saw nothing 
wrong with its premise, which was ―. . . a 
reaffirmation of the supremacy of our Constitution 
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and the right of Congress, under the Constitution, to 
annul by subsequent act of its own any provision of 
any treaty.‖34 However, the President made clear he 
thought the language of the Bricker Amendment 
tied the president‘s hands and ―. . . would be notice 
to our friends as well as our enemies abroad that our 
country intends to withdraw from its leadership in 
world affairs . . . It would impair our hopes and 
plans for peace and for the successful achievement 
of the important international matters now under 
discussion.‖35 Bricker‘s proposal appeared to be 
subtly criticizing the United Nations by declaring 
that it would not permit international organizations 
from controlling or adjudicating the rights of 
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American citizens.
36
 Eisenhower and Attorney 
General Herbert Brownell tried to convince Bricker 
to delay the Senate‘s consideration of his proposal, 
but Bricker introduced it anyway, and signed on 
sixty-three other senators as cosponsors. In turn, 
Eisenhower worked with Republican leader 
William Knowland to introduce what was called the 
Knowland Substitute for the Bricker Amendment. 
Essentially, though, this was Eisenhower‘s 
counterproposal, simply reaffirming the Senate‘s 
ability to ratify all foreign treaties.
37
  
 However, Lyndon Johnson soon managed to 
develop a more popular alternative to Bricker. 
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Johnson considered the Bricker Amendment an 
insult to former Democratic Presidents Roosevelt 
and Truman, not to mention an impediment if he 
himself ever became president. Yet, he was also 
under a great deal of pressure because most 
southern Democrats supported Bricker, as did Sid 
Richardson.
38
 Johnson, in this case, showed his 
political cunning by meeting with Secretary of State 
John Foster Dulles, and asking Dulles to convince 
Eisenhower to publicly denounce Bricker‘s 
Amendment.
39
 Most importantly, though, Johnson 
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convinced Democratic Senator Walter George to 
propose a more moderate alternative to Bricker‘s 
measure. George‘s motion dictated that 
international treaties could not become law if they 
violated the Constitution, and all United Nations 
Charters and Executive agreements (but not formal 
treaties) required approval by Congress. Johnson, 
though, wanted the George Resolution to fail as 
well, but by a closer and more respectable margin. 
Johnson hoped the George Resolution would draw 
some conservatives from Bricker and, if George 
failed, he hoped the issue might be laid to rest.
40
 
Eisenhower himself might have accepted the 
George Amendment, but again felt such an 
amendment was not necessary. He also feared its 
passage might make it appear that the Democrats 
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had once again saved his administration. Yet, as 
historian Daune Tananbaum noted, this was hardly 
the reality; in fact Eisenhower ―. . . played an active 
role in the deliberations within the administration 
and the efforts to work out a compromise with 
Senator George and the Democrats and the 
Republican leaders.‖41 On February 26, 1954, both 
amendments were up for a vote. Bricker‘s only 
garnered forty-two votes to fifty in opposition. 
George received sixty votes, but thirty-one opposed 
him, which kept the amendment from meeting the 
required support from the two-thirds of the Senate.
42
 
Johnson had apparently executed the voting exactly 
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to his desire and received the credit he sought from 
the press. What the press missed was how 
Republican dissent from the George Resolution 
effectively showcased Eisenhower‘s influence, as 
thirteen moderate ―Eisenhower Republicans‖ voted 
against George, because, as Tananbaum noted, ―of 
the administration‘s objections.‖43 Scholars have 
looked to the Bricker debate to prove Johnson‘s 
prowess as Majority Leader, and, for that matter, his 
ability to calculate votes and hold Democratic 
support exactly where he wanted it should give him 
notable credit for diffusing Bricker. As the ―master 
of the Senate,‖ Johnson deserves no less. Still, 
Eisenhower worked his own influence behind the 
scenes (and in public, wherever necessary), and 
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played a critical role in working towards the goal, 
which, on this occasion, he and Johnson shared. 
 The debate over the Bricker Amendment 
was only a momentary interruption in the saga of 
Senator Joseph R. McCarthy. As McCarthy‘s 
committee began hearings with the U.S. Army in 
early 1954, Johnson kept silent. He feared a 
Democratic assault against McCarthy would unite 
the Republicans and make the notorious Wisconsin 
senator a partisan issue. As Johnson put it, ―. . . why 
put on the brave act, beat one‘s chest, and net 
twenty-five votes against Joe, and in turn get 
smeared and unite the Republicans behind Joe.‖44 
Although Democrats and Johnson approved 
McCarthy‘s censure, it was Eisenhower‘s efforts to 
subtly undermine McCarthy that had greater 
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influence in slowly, but surely, securing 
McCarthy‘s downfall.45 United Nations 
Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge later wrote that in 
a meeting on January 21, 1954, Eisenhower laid out 
a clever strategy based on televising the upcoming 
Army-McCarthy hearings. Figuring the hearings 
would not go well for McCarthy, Eisenhower then 
arranged for Vermont Senator Ralph Flanders to 
call for McCarthy‘s censure. This move ultimately 
triggered an investigative committee which 
recommended censure to the entire Senate body. 
Eisenhower‘s plan moved cautiously, but its result 
indicated that Eisenhower was just as crafty as the 
wily Johnson.
46
 Johnson, though, worked 
effectively as well, wherever he thought he could 
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help to undermine McCarthy. Especially when, 
prior to his censure, McCarthy introduced a 
resolution limiting presidential ability to negotiate 
within the ―Big Four‖ powers (Great Britain, 
France, the Soviet Union, and the United States). 
Johnson countered McCarthy‘s attention-getting 
ploy by quickly bringing it to a vote on the floor, 
where it was struck down. Eisenhower privately 
celebrated the result, saying ―McCarthyism‖ had 
been reduced to ―McCarthywasm.‖47 Thus, while 
Johnson and Eisenhower did not necessarily work 
jointly, they again had a common goal in seeing 
McCarthy‘s influence ended, and aided each other 
by both working towards it.  
Playing Politics: Cracks in the Partnership 
 During the second term, their dynamic 
shifted significantly. The two shared fewer goals as 
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Johnson was no longer satisfied helping the 
President‘s agenda, but instead wanted to advance 
one of his own -  an agenda which benefitted him 
the most. Johnson‘s change of heart, however, 
allowed Eisenhower to prove his true leadership 
ability in Congress, through issues like civil rights 
in 1957. Based on proposals made by Attorney 
General Herbert Brownell in 1956, proposals which 
never made it to the Senate floor, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1957 would be the most critical piece of 
legislation debated by the Congress that year. This 
came about, according to Brownell, thanks to 
Illinois Senator Paul Douglas, who managed to 
―extract‖ a promise from Johnson which assured 
civil rights would be considered early in the 1957 
session.
48
 Then Vice President Richard Nixon, 
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Republican Leader William Knowland, and 
Brownell arranged for Knowland to bring the act to 
the Senate floor directly, where Nixon, as the 
presiding officer, authorized the bill for 
consideration by the full Senate, thus allowing the 
act to avoid first being sent to the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, where Chairman James Eastland, a 
vehement supporter of segregation, would certainly 
have killed it. By employing an obscure Senate rule, 
these members of Eisenhower‘s team managed to 
advance the measure. Kept uninformed of this 
maneuver, Johnson and other southerners in the 
Senate denounced the scheme as unfair.
49
 The 
provisions of Brownell and Eisenhower‘s Act 
established a Civil Rights Commission, created a 
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Civil Rights Division at the Justice Department, 
authorized the Attorney General to bring charges 
against voting rights discrimination, and guaranteed 
no jury trials for civil rights violators (as all-white 
juries typically acquitted those charged with civil 
rights violations). Johnson allowed debate to begin 
on the bill, but remained neutral on it.
50
 Johnson 
wanted a mild civil rights act that would pacify his 
caucus of Democrats which was becoming 
increasingly fractured between liberals and 
conservatives.
51
 Johnson argued that the bill would 
not be passed if the clause giving the Attorney 
General authority in regards to voting rights 
remained in the legislation. This codicil infuriated 
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the President, who already saw the bill as a 
compromise solution. Nevertheless, Eisenhower 
agreed to withdraw his support for that clause.
52
 As 
Brownell insisted, Eisenhower had to be practical.
53
 
However, historian David Nichols questioned 
whether Eisenhower knew some of these provisions 
would fail and used them as bargaining tools against 
Johnson and the southern Democrats.
54
  
 Johnson, however, weakened the Civil 
Rights Act further by proposing an amendment 
which would have guaranteed jury trials to those 
accused of committing civil rights violations. 
Johnson took this action to ease the fears of 
southerners about the Act. Angered, Eisenhower 
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considered scrapping the entire Act.
55
 Instead, 
Eisenhower and newly sworn-in Attorney General 
William Rogers used their influence on Capitol Hill 
to reach a compromise with Johnson and the 
Democrats on the Act‘s final language, which 
dictated that the specifics of a case would determine 
whether defendants would have a jury trial.
56
 The 
compromise provided that as long as a defendant 
faced no more than a three-hundred dollar fine and 
a jail sentence of forty-five days (reduced from 
ninety), no jury would be gathered.
57
 Despite a 
twenty-four hour filibuster by Senator Strom 
Thurmond, the first Civil Rights Act was passed by 
Congress and signed by the President in late 
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August. Johnson took credit for the bill, while all of 
the efforts of Eisenhower and his subordinates were 
less obvious by comparison.
58
 Johnson had walked 
a tight-rope between a crusader for civil rights who 
would soon be seeking the presidency and a 
pragmatic senator trying not to lose the support of 
his southern delegation. Regardless of who received 
credit for the bill, clearly Johnson was not the ally 
he used to be for Eisenhower. 
 The remainder of 1957 only worsened their 
relationship. Back in May, Johnson and the Senate 
had cut funding for the United States Information 
Agency (USIA), a critical aspect of the President‘s 
propaganda efforts. Eisenhower wrote Johnson, ―I 
am very disappointed that in this instance you found 
it desirable to reduce rather than to increase the 
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pressure of our effort [with the USIA] . . . it is still 
difficult for me to understand why this vital weapon 
in our arsenal would be blunted at this critical 
juncture in world affairs.‖59 Johnson also opposed 
Eisenhower‘s decision to send the 101st Airborne 
Division to Little Rock High School for the 
enforcement of school desegregation. Johnson 
remarked, ―There should be no troops from either 
side patrolling our school campuses.‖60 Later, as the 
1957 session drew to a close, Congress appropriated 
only $2.7 billion of the $3.8 billion in funding 
Eisenhower had requested for mutual security 
programs. Looking back, Eisenhower sourly 
concluded, ―The 1957 session marked the low point 
in effective cooperation between the administration 
                                                 
59
 Galambos and Van Ee, Dwight D. Eisenhower to 
Lyndon B. Johnson, The Presidential Papers of Dwight D. 
Eisenhower, Vol, 18, 174. 
60
 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 171. 
 204 
and the Congress.‖61 The situation looked no better 
in 1958. 
Space Race Initiatives 
As much as the Senate suited him, Johnson‘s 
life‘s desire was to be president, and Eisenhower‘s 
closed-door methods sometimes allowed an 
uncooperative Johnson to act the part. A notable 
example followed the Soviet Union‘s October 1, 
1957 launch of Sputnik, the first satellite to orbit the 
earth. As described by Johnson‘s aide George 
Reedy, Sputnik stunned the American public and 
fueled fears that the United States was now falling 
behind in the technological battle of the Cold War. 
Eisenhower, according to Reedy, dismissed Sputnik 
as an expensive ―toy.‖62 Eisenhower did tell the 
press, ―As far as the satellite is concerned, that does 
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not raise my apprehensions [about the Soviet 
Union], not one iota. I can see nothing at this 
moment, at this stage of development, that is 
significant . . .  as far as security is concerned.‖63 
However, Eisenhower‘s words were surely spoken 
with a desire to calm the fears of the public, and not 
out of ignorance, as Reedy implied. Nevertheless, 
using his seat of the Senate Armed Services 
Subcommittee on Preparedness as his platform, 
Johnson brought in scientists to testify about the 
importance of understanding and traveling in outer 
space. Johnson then introduced the National 
Aeronautic and Space Act before the Senate during 
the 1958 session. This piece of legislation 
established the National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA), a national civilian space 
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agency. To cap off his efforts, Johnson delivered a 
nationally televised speech about the need for 
exploration in space, in a performance which some 
called his first ―State of the Union‖ address. 
Overall, Reedy wrote, ―The picture was that of a 
president ignoring what many people regarded as 
the greatest crisis in centuries while the Senate 
Democratic leader was working night and day to 
mobilize the nation to meet the challenge.‖ This 
situation further enhanced the argument that the real 
power in Washington lay with Lyndon Johnson, as 
some Americans began to ask if this was the man 
who was really running the country.
64
 However, 
Reedy conveniently excluded from his narrative an 
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executive message from Eisenhower to Congress a 
full two months before the Space Act passed. It was 
this message which formally proposed the creation 
of NASA.
65
 In fact, any hesitation from the White 
House towards the Space Act was not derived from 
opposition to NASA itself, but rather due to 
objections concerning the creation of a seven-
member policy board for the federal space agency. 
Eisenhower and his advisors felt the board was in 
conflict ―with the concept of a single head [of 
NASA] directly responsible to the President,‖ and 
was likely to divide responsibilities, and make it 
―difficult to hold anyone accountable for results.‖66 
Clearly Eisenhower was not unconcerned with 
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satellites and space exploration and even had his 
own recommendations on the matter.
67
 To resolve 
the issue, Eisenhower arranged a private meeting 
with Johnson and convinced the Majority Leader to 
replace the policy board with an advisory group, 
which gave greater authority over NASA to the 
President.
68
 With these facts in mind, and though 
Johnson was the crucial force in establishing the 
space agency, Reedy‘s assessment of Eisenhower as 
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an unconcerned and out-of-touch president, an 
impression some historians embraced, is proven 
inaccurate.  
A Most Shameful Day and the End of Cooperation 
 Eisenhower, however, was not destined to 
always emerge victorious when he and Johnson 
were not aligned. By 1959, Johnson‘s and 
Eisenhower‘s interactions had become much more 
limited. On June 25 Eisenhower had sent Johnson a 
strongly worded letter urging him, in the name of 
protecting the nation‘s classified information, to 
withhold a resolution permitting Congress to 
investigate national security agencies up to their 
highest levels of authority. What is most striking 
about the letter, though, is that Eisenhower no 
longer addresses it ―Dear Lyndon‖ (as was 
customary with earlier correspondence), but a more 
 210 
formal ―Dear Senator Johnson,‖ suggesting that 
their partnership was now more distant.
69
 George 
Reedy, for one, noticed Eisenhower was applying 
the veto power much more frequently. 
70
 Conditions 
reached a boiling point when Eisenhower 
nominated former Atomic Energy Commission 
member Lewis Strauss to be Secretary of 
Commerce. Strauss, though, had already clashed 
with Congressional Democrats while serving on the 
commission.
71
 Although Johnson was publicly 
undecided about Strauss until the day of the 
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confirmation vote in June, he had worked covertly 
to gain the support of Republicans William Langer 
and Margaret Chase Smith to oppose Strauss.
72
 
Always the master of surprises, Johnson brought the 
confirmation to a vote rather unexpectedly on June 
18th, when three Republican Senators were out of 
town and one could not return in time (Eisenhower 
dispatched two Air Force planes to pick-up the 
other two).
73
 Johnson‘s scheme had made all the 
difference as Strauss was voted down by a 49-46 
margin. No better example illustrates Johnson‘s 
greatest advantage over Eisenhower: the power he 
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held over the Senate. Regardless of how the 
President tried to influence or sway him, Johnson 
had his own methods of persuading or controlling 
his fellow senators. In the end, it was fairly often 
the case that Johnson made the final call on issues 
like the Strauss nomination. Eisenhower, on the 
other hand, was simply enraged by the final vote, 
declaring ―this is the most shameful day in Senate 
history [since the attempt to impeach Andrew 
Johnson in the 1868].‖74 Privately, he consoled 
Strauss by writing him, ―I believe that all those 
members of the Senate who voted against your 
confirmation will eventually come to reflect with 
deep regret upon the day they decided to refuse 
confirmation to one whose reputation for courage, 
integrity, and good judgment makes him one of our 
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distinguished Americans.‖75 Johnson was deeply 
offended by Eisenhower‘s criticism, and barely 
spoke with the President until he received a call 
from Eisenhower ―apologizing for any 
misunderstanding.‖76 Still, the damage was done 
and the Strauss nomination appeared to join the 
Bohlen nomination in 1953 as bookends for the 
Eisenhower-Johnson dynamic, as essentially one 
opened and the other closed the relationship. As 
Johnson planned to seek his party‘s nomination in 
1960, any remaining camaraderie between the two 
faded. Johnson, as the next presidential election 
neared, distanced himself from Eisenhower, and the 
President was growing exhausted with Johnson‘s 
political games. 
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 In March of 1960 the two managed to 
cooperate for one last significant compromise, a 
second Civil Rights Act. Eisenhower‘s version of 
the act would have been an indirect endorsement of 
the 1954 Supreme Court decision Brown v. Board 
of Education of Topeka.
77
 Johnson, though, 
garnered enough support to pull education grants 
from the act. However, Eisenhower refused to 
concede a clause which allowed federal authorities 
to inspect voter registration lists and assess 
penalties if cases of clear discrimination arose. 
After eighteen southern senators filibustered for 
one-hundred and twenty-five hours, the longest in 
Senate history, Johnson broke the filibuster and the 
Senate passed the Civil Rights Act. Once more, 
Johnson received much of the publicity and credit 
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while Eisenhower was the silent force behind the 
legislation.
78
 Following the final vote, Republican 
Congressional Leaders complained to Eisenhower 
during one of their many meetings with the 
President that they were upset by Johnson‘s 
coverage in the media. Exasperated as well, 
Eisenhower admitted, ―I don‘t know what to do - 
but I get annoyed about [the credit going to 
Johnson] . . . Except for this political game, I 
wouldn‘t care who gets credit for something that‘s 
good to have.‖79 Few statements better summarize 
this position, which Eisenhower held consistently 
throughout his tenure. Months later the approach of 
the 1960 election brought these ill feelings between 
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the two to a fever-pitch. At one of his stag dinners 
in late July, Eisenhower was asked by members of 
the press to name several Democrats whom he 
respected and who might be nominated to succeed 
him as president. Eisenhower listed Senators John 
Stennis of Mississippi, Spessard Holland of Florida, 
and Frank Lausche of Ohio. Reporters were quick 
to note the absence of Johnson from the President‘s 
―recommendations,‖ though based their increased 
hostilities during Eisenhower‘s second term, this 
should not have been surprising. The President even 
refused the suggestion of his aide Bryce Harlow to 
mention Johnson‘s name after the fact. Ann 
Whitman noted, ―The President brushed the 
[suggestion] off, saying that Johnson had made 
some comments much worse about him . . .‖ The 
result was an awkward meeting between 
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Eisenhower, Johnson, Rayburn, and Harlow on 
August 3
rd
. Meant to be another simple private chat 
to discuss Congressional matters, the gathering was 
marked by Johnson giving the President the silent 
treatment. In the aftermath of these events, Robert 
Anderson went to meet with Johnson while 
Eisenhower‘s own Congressional liaison fractured 
as Harlow accused Wilton Persons and Press 
Secretary James Hagerty of ―poisoning the 
President‘s mind‖ against Johnson and firmly 
declared that Johnson would make the best 
president out of any Democrat.‖80  
 Ultimately, the point was moot as Johnson 
had been nominated by the Democrats for the Vice 
Presidency several weeks earlier, but was 
significant in that these events acknowledged that 
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the relationship between the President and the 
Senate Majority Leader had ended. Congress was 
soon in recess for the election season, which saw 
Eisenhower make a multi-state campaign tour on 
behalf of Nixon‘s Presidential campaign. Once 
more, Eisenhower and Johnson were on completely 
opposed sides, this time in one of the most 
contentious presidential elections of the twentieth 
century. No other reason so effectively 
demonstrated why their partnership could not 
endure, for they ultimately had party allegiances 
that, at their core, made them political adversaries. 
The Common Experience of the Presidency 
 Following Senator John Kennedy‘s triumph 
over Nixon in the election, Eisenhower sent 
telegrams to the candidates on both parties‘ national 
tickets. The shortest, just a one sentence message of 
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congratulations, was sent to Vice President-elect 
Johnson.
81
 Whatever remained of their relationship 
seemingly mattered little, as both Johnson and 
Eisenhower would soon face new positions, 
especially as the latter would shortly be leaving 
public service for retirement. 
 Neither Eisenhower nor Johnson received all 
of what they wanted out of their relationship. 
Eisenhower did not get all of his administration‘s 
agenda passed, and Johnson was obviously not 
elected president in 1960. Yet, a firm portion of the 
Eisenhower Administration‘s agenda was enacted 
and Johnson would become president in time. 
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Ultimately, Johnson was far easier for Eisenhower 
to work with then many Democrats and even certain 
Republicans such as Bricker, McCarthy, and 
Knowland. Additionally, Eisenhower‘s sometimes 
covert leadership allowed Johnson to get the press 
and praise he craved. Together, they managed to 
share power in a political chess game for 
Eisenhower‘s entire tenure (six years of which 
found the Senate controlled by Johnson and the 
Democrats) with only minimal public spats. Their 
relationship, interestingly, would greatly improve in 
the 1960s as Eisenhower became a valuable 
supporter of President Johnson as armed conflict in 
the country of Vietnam intensified with the 
dramatic escalation of U.S. forces. Their partnership 
during the 1950s, even at its best moments, had 
never been close. It was, some argued, the common 
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experience of the being President which aided their 
reconciliation. 
 History still judges their respective legacies. 
Their philosophies were different and their methods 
were nearly polar opposites, but together they 
helped the government function in meaningful ways 
throughout the 1950s. This story is also a small part 
of a larger narrative about Eisenhower and his 
leadership. For someone who entered the 
presidency with no legislative experience, 
Eisenhower was quick to grasp the challenges and 
opportunities it presented him as president, 
including the savvy Democratic leader whom 
Eisenhower had to flatter, appease, pressure, and 
take-to-task in order to achieve the amount of 
success with Congress he wanted. The fact that 
Eisenhower learned to deal with Johnson, regardless 
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of whether the Majority Leader was being helpful, 
stubborn, or manipulative, said something about the 
President‘s ability to grasp the inner-workings of 
partisan politics. Ultimately, Johnson was a fairly 
open book to Eisenhower; he knew what the Texan 
wanted and how devious he was in his efforts at 
political domination and self-promotion. One must 
imagine the disadvantage lay with Senator Johnson, 
who appeared unable to fully comprehend the 
motives of the private, calculated, and cautious 
Eisenhower, which was a tribute to the President‘s 
methodology for governing: a popular confidence 
with a quiet but powerful presence of authority.
